Conflicts and Integration - Revisiting Costa v ENEL and Simmental II by Hofmann, Herwig
JOBNAME: Maduro PAGE: 24 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Thu Jan 14 10:20:39 2010
3
Conflicts and Integration: Revisiting Costa
v ENEL and Simmenthal II
HERWIG CH HOFMANN
This short Chapter revisits the cases of Costa v ENEL49 and Simmenthal II50 and their
effect on the development of the specific nature and the constitutional order of the EU.
Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II are cases well known for their impact on defining the
legal parameters which govern the legal system of the EU/EC. These cases are true classics
in the history of case law of the ECJ and thus have been discussed to great detail in legal
writing. I will not attempt within this Chapter to do justice to the nuances and the
ongoing debates in this literature. Instead, this Chapter will focus on a more rarely
addressed but nonetheless central aspect of the cases: it will argue that the specific
contribution of Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II to the development and definition of the
Community legal system arises from a fruitful and productive tension. This tension results
from a dichotomy between, on one hand, a rule of conflicts, and, on the other, the notion
of the integration of legal systems.
Initially, the principle of supremacy, as outlined in these cases, seems to be establishing
a hierarchy of norms between EC and national law. It introduces a conflicts rule giving
precedence to Community law over national legal provisions in cases of conflict.51 The
cases, however, equally establish the notion of integration, which, according to Costa v
ENEL and Simmenthal II, is based on the E(E)C Treaty having ‘created its own legal
system’ which upon entry into force ‘became an integral part of the legal systems of the
Member States’52 and is ‘applicable in the territory of each of the Member States’.53
The establishment of the principle of supremacy therefore has not led simply to the
superimposition of a new level of public power over that of the Member States. The ECJ’s
approach in its case law from Costa v ENEL to Simmenthal II led to a unique system of
shared sovereignty, in which hierarchic relations are only elements within a wider
49 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.
50 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA (Simmenthal II) [1978] ECR 629.
51 This is the point of view from which the cases had predominantly been discussed in the first 20 years after
Costa v ENEL. See, eg, Samkalden, ‘Annotation Costa v ENEL 6/64’ [1964] CML Rev 213–20; MA Dauses,
‘Anmerkung zu Urteil des EuGH vom 9 März 1978’ RS 106/77 [1978] Juristenzeitung 512–13; D Carreau, ‘Droit
communautaire et droits nationaux: concurrence ou primauté? [1978] Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen
381–418; D Freestone, ‘The Supremacy of Community Law in National Courts’ 42 MLR [1979] 220–3; G
Droesse, ‘Das Simmenthal II-Urteil des EuGH in der italienischen Rechtsprechung und Literatur’ [1983]
Europarecht 272–83; B de Witte, ‘Retour à “Costa”: La primauté du droit communautaire à la lumière du droit
international’ [1984] Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 425–54.
52 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, para 8 (emphasis added).
53 Case 106/77 Simmenthal II [1978] ECR 629, para 17.
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structure of jointly exercising public powers. The Chapter is committed to exploring this
unique method of sharing sovereignty within the tension between conflicts and integration.
Supremacy as a Rule of Conflict
One of the essential legal issues the founding Treaties’ texts had not explicitly addressed
was whether the traditional rules of public international law could be applied within the
Community legal system. In other words, whether the ECSC and E(E)C Treaties had
created a new kind of legal order, which was a third type of law not fitting into the
traditional dualism of national and public international law.54
It was thus left to the ECJ to analyse these questions in greater detail. Initially, the
European Court of Justice was cautious. In an early staff case arising under the ECSC,
Humblet v Belgian State,55 the Court found that it ‘is evident from the Treaty’ which has
the ‘force of law in the Member States’ that where Member State’s legislative or adminis-
trative measures are ‘contrary to Community law’, a Member State is obliged ‘to rescind
the measure in question’.56 Essentially, although the Court in Humblet found that ECSC
law took ‘precedence over national law’, it left it to the Member States to define in which
way Community law could take effect in Member States.57 Humblet was thus based on a
rather ‘traditional’ public international law understanding of the conflicts question of the
relation of Community law to the law of the Member States.
The change of parameters came in the case of Costa v ENEL in which the Court held a
firm position in what Advocate General Lagrange had characterised as a question of the
constitutional relations between the Community and the Member States.58 The Court
found that Member States had delegated to the Community the power to define the
relationship between Community law and the law of the Member States. The reasoning
given by the Court is well known: Community law ‘stemming from the Treaty’ was ‘an
independent source of law’ which could not ‘be overridden by domestic legal provisions,
however framed’.59 In contrast to Humblet, Costa v ENEL establishes that the Community
54 This can be explained by the fact that the Treaties of Paris and Rome were created against a background of
sovereign states in Europe. Under the classic notion of territorial sovereignty states acted either in the framework
of national law or public international law. Public international law was the ‘law of contracts’ between sovereign
states.
55 Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgian State [1960] ECR English special edition 559.
56 Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgian State [1960] ECR English special edition 559, at 569. In Humblet the notion
of supremacy of Community law was discussed before Van Gend en Loos had established direct effect of EC law.
57 One could argue that when understanding ‘force of law’ in Humblet as referring to law in general and not
as a ‘loi formelle’, Humblet was in fact a first step towards a non-traditional understanding of the role of
Community law vis-à-vis Member State law (to this effect see: B de Witte, ‘Retour à “Costa”: La primauté du droit
communautaire à la lumière du droit international’ [1984] Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 425–54 at 426).
Generally, however, the earlier commentators seem to have understood the relevance of the term to stand for law
in the more narrow sense of a ‘loi formelle’, which indicates a more traditional reading of the case in line with
public international law. See, eg, H-P Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Tübingen, Mohr, 1972), 296.
58 Opinion of Advocate General Maurice Lagrange in Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 1171 (French
edition).
59 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, para 13. It subsequently would be ‘impossible for the States, as a
corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on
a basis of reciprocity’ (para 10). The ECJ summarised that ‘[t]he transfer by the states from their domestic legal
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legal order itself defines when and how it takes precedence over the law of the Member
States. This is Costa v ENEL’s well-understood central innovation to the former strict
dichotomy of public international law on one hand and national law on the other. With
the integration of Community law ‘into the laws of each Member State’,60 precedence was
given to co-operatively created law over unilateral acts of the Member States.
The principles established in Costa v ENEL were confirmed and further developed in
the case law of the ECJ, most notably in Simmenthal II.61 Based on Costa v ENEL, the
Court in Simmenthal II held that ‘in accordance with the principle of precedence of
Community law’, EC law can ‘render automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision’
of law of the Member States.62 Member States were obliged to ‘set aside’ national law
‘which might prevent Community rules from having full force and effect’63 because
Community law was ‘an integral part of ’ ‘the legal order applicable in the territory of each
of the Member States’.64
From this perspective, the case law from Costa v ENEL to Simmenthal II transformed
the understanding of how conflicts between Community law and Member States’ law
would be decided. The cases established an autonomous vertical Community rule of
conflicts: they declared the supremacy of any provision of Community law, including
single case decisions of administrative nature, over any form of Member State law,
including general principles of national constitutional law. Community law thus itself
defines its rank within the legal system of its Member States.
The goal of this transformation was openly stated in Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II.
Community law, which was collectively established through the Community method, was
given primacy over unilaterally set national law, precisely with the goal to empower EC law
to confer rights and obligations not only on states as subjects of public international law
but also on individuals. If states could unilaterally, through their constitutional provisions
or otherwise, impede the exercise of the rights of individuals, such rights would not exist.
The innovative factor of the Community legal organisation and one of its arguments for
supremacy is thus the joint exercise of powers as shared sovereignty.65 Through this
approach, the cases of Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II had become essential building
blocks in integrating EC law into national law and the central move towards what is often
loosely referred to as ‘constitutionalisation’.
system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a
permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the
concept of the Community cannot prevail’ (para 14).
60 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, para 9. Community law in this sense consists of explicit
‘provisions which derive from the Community’ but also ‘and more generally the terms and the spirit of the
Treaty’.
61 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA (Simmenthal II) [1978] ECR 629.
62 It further stated that EC law precludes ‘the valid adoption of new national legislative measures to the
extent to which they would be incompatible with Community provisions’. Case 106/77 Simmenthal II [1978]
ECR 629, para 17.
63 Case 106/77 Simmenthal II [1978] ECR 629, para 22.
64 ‘Any recognition that national legislative measures which encroach upon the field within which the
Community exercises its legislative power or which are otherwise incompatible with the provisions of Commu-
nity law’ ‘would amount to a corresponding denial of the effectiveness of obligations undertaken unconditionally
and irrevocably by Member States … and would thus imperil the very foundations of the Community’ (Case
106/77 Simmenthal II [1978] ECR 629, para 17).
65 Article I-6 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe thus includes an explicit reference to the
principle of supremacy as restatement of established case law.
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Integration
Integration leading away from public international law towards the Community system of
shared sovereignty changed the EC as much as the Member States. The former evolved
from an international treaty to a legal order of a constitutional nature. The latter gradually
opened themselves to the exercise of public power from outside their territory. Thereby,
the old dichotomy of public international law and national law with its distinguishing
feature of territorial reach of national law became increasingly less important. The
dichotomy was replaced by an evolving network of structures for the exercise of public
power in a system of shared sovereignty. The first and most visible aspect thereof was the
creation of a judicial network of courts. The second aspect of shared sovereignty, the
integration of the legislative and executive power, became increasingly structured in
networks which have often evolved beyond formally set rules in the founding Treaties.
Both developments are aspects of the important element of ‘integration’ which was
stressed in Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II, but continues to receive much less attention
than the conflicts rule of supremacy. I will address these two aspects of integration
separately.
Judicial Network
The development of shared sovereignty through a network of courts is exceptionally well
exemplified by Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II. As many of the important cases in the EC
legal history, both reached the ECJ as references for a preliminary ruling under Article 234
EC (ex Article 177). In both cases the defendants argued primarily procedural aspects
calling into question the right of national courts to request a preliminary ruling.
In Costa v ENEL, the Italian government had submitted that the reference for prelimi-
nary ruling was ‘absolutely inadmissible’ because the referring Italian court was not
entitled to issue a decision to stay procedures and to refer the question to the ECJ directly
on Article 234 EC. Instead, it was obliged to apply Italian law, which only allowed for
preliminary references to the Italian Constitutional Court.66 The ECJ answered rather
categorically with a general statement on the nature of E(E)C law. It held that the question
whether the national court could directly rely on Article 234 EC (ex 177) for a reference
for preliminary ruling was governed by Community law. Otherwise, as was already noted
above, unilaterally set national law would be capable of overriding Community law.67 This
pattern was repeated in Simmenthal II,68 where the Court held that the right of requesting
66 For the background of the Italian courts’ multiple requests for references, see Samkalden, ‘Annotation
Costa v ENEL 6/64’, [1964] CML Rev 213–20 at 214.
67 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, paras 10, 14: it would be ‘impossible for the States, as a corollary,
to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of
reciprocity’ (para 10). The ‘transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system
of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign
rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot
prevail’ (para 14).
68 The Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato had argued that according to Italian constitutional law,
Italian legislative provisions violating EC law were unconstitutional. Only the Italian Constitutional Court had
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a preliminary reference cannot be impeded by Member States’ law because such provisions
would risk creating unequal application of Community law in the Member States. As a
result, courts from all levels would have the right to refer cases to the ECJ for preliminary
ruling under Community law.
In Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II, the ECJ thereby reinforced the importance and role
of a network of courts established by Article 234 EC (ex 177) with the goal of holding both
European and national actors accountable. It was thus assured that the relations between
the courts were non-hierarchic in so far as national law could not—against the explicit
wording of Article 234 EC—request the exhaustion of national remedies prior to a request
for preliminary ruling by the ECJ. The result is a system in which the national judge is also
a Community judge and supremacy of Community law does not imply inferiority of
national courts. Equally, the ECJ, in cases of a request for preliminary ruling, only decides
the Community law aspects of cases. The final decision of the case rests with a national
judge. By establishing a rule of conflicts and reinforcing the role of a network of courts,
Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II strengthened the jurisdictions of both the national courts
and the ECJ vis-à-vis the executive powers. Also, in some dimensions, individuals were put
on the same level as Member States. Individuals were empowered by Article 234 EC in
combination with the principles of supremacy and direct effect to enforce Community law
and to request the review of the compliance of national provisions with Community law.
Executive Networks
The second and more hidden element of integrating legal systems arising from the
interpretation of Community Law established in Costa v ENEL and confirmed in Simmen-
thal II is the role of executive networks for joint exercise of shared sovereignty. Unlike the
judicial network, the executive network was the product of a rather fluid and evolutionary
development in several historic phases. This is the real legacy of Costa v ENEL’s notion of
declaring Community law an ‘integral part of the legal systems of the Member States’.69
The effect of this opening of Member States to the exercise of public power from outside
of their territory might be illustrated in a simplified step-by-step presentation by looking
at vertical, horizontal and diagonal integration.
Vertical Integration
The main effect of the principle of supremacy established by the ECJ in Costa v ENEL and
Simmenthal II initially was to establish a rule for vertical conflicts between Community
and national law. This vertical conflicts rule held that any form of directly applicable
Community law would render inapplicable conflicting national law irrespective of its rank
the right to declare unconstitutional and thus set aside acts of Italian law. Therefore the Pretore de Susa was
obliged to refer the case to the Italian Constitutional Court and not to the ECJ (Case 106/77 Simmenthal II
[1978] ECR 629, para 6).
69 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, para 8.
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in the national hierarchy of norms.70 This general principle of vertical conflicts has, in
principle, been accepted by the courts of the Member States.71
However, despite Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II’s effect to open the Member States’
legal systems, implementation of law was still state-bound. The effects of the exercise of
public power from the European level remained limited to the individual Member State.
The national legal heritage, of which supranational law had become part, was still
exercised exclusively within the territory of each individual Member State.72
The vertical nature of this conflicts rule makes it seem, therefore, at first sight that a
hierarchical relationship between EU/EC law and Member State law had been created by
Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II. This, however, would be a simplistic and incomplete
reading as the reality is more complex. Supremacy of EU/EC law developed over time into
a far less hierarchic and more network oriented structure.
Horizontal Integration
The second major development was the‘horizontal’opening of Member States’ legal systems.
Since the mid 1970s, ECJ case law increasingly focused on the obligation of the Member
States to mutually recognise legal acts of other Member States, especially where such was
necessary to allow for the exercise of fundamental freedoms within the EC.73 Mutual
recognition led to trans-territorial effect of the law of one Member State in another Member
State. That effect was ordered by Community law and thus necessarily based on the notion of
supremacy. The Simmenthal cases powerfully demonstrate this. The Simmenthal saga strad-
dles both the horizontal and the vertical aspect of supremacy.In Simmenthal I, the underlying
question was whether in order to allow for the exercise of the free movement of goods, the
Italian authorities were obliged to horizontally recognise a veterinary certificate issued by the
French authorities.74 EC law therefore required, in a‘horizontal conflicts’ case, that the law of
France have effect in Italy.After the ECJ in a preliminary ruling had affirmed this,Simmenthal
70 It is, however, important to recall that European law was acceptable to Member States inter alia because it
was not completely alien to the national systems. In European integration, states allowed public power to be
exercised also from outside of their legal systems under the condition of being able to participate in its creation
and implementation. Member States’ executives had become key figures in agenda setting, the legislative
procedures as well as the creation of common rules for implementation. With deepening integration to which
there is no opt-out, Member States were accepting EC law only because they were fully integrated into the
legislative and implementing process (JHH Weiler, ‘The transformation of Europe’, 100 Yale Law Journal [1991]
2403–83 at 2413–23).
71 The latter in some instances requiring only an exceptional ultra vires role in reviewing the ECJ. For an
overview see K Lenaerts and P Van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union, 2nd edn (London,
Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), paras 17–015–17–046. This interpretation of EU/EC law has equally not been
challenged in any of the many Treaty amendments from the Single European Act to the Treaty of Nice. In Article
I-6 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the primacy rule was explicitly spelt out.
72 In administrative terms, this corresponded to the model of implementation and indirect administration
of Community law in each and every Member State separately. C Joerges, ‘The Legitimacy of Supranational
Decision Making’ [2006] 44 Journal of Common Market Studies [2006], 779–802 at 791–3.
73 This horizontal opening is most closely associated with Case 120/78 Rewe Central AG (Cassis de Dijon)
[1979] ECR 649, which required Member States to mutually accept each other’s legislative and administrative
decisions in the absence of harmonising legislation from the European level (paras 8, 14).
74 Case 35/76 Simmenthal I [1976] ECR 1871 then provided for the obligation of a Member State to accept
the veterinary certificates of another Member State in the case of an investigation procedure harmonised by a
directive.
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II was a case about the consequences of such a ruling on Italian law. The local judge, the
Pretore de Susa, needed to know whether he had the right to set aside Italian law which had
been found to be incompatible with EC law.75 As a result, the ECJ found that the supremacy of
Community law obliged Member States to allow for trans-territorial effect of other Member
States’ law within their legal system.Thereby,Member States had opened their territory to the
application of public power not only from the Community level, but also horizontally from
other Member States.76
The Move Towards an Integrated Legal System—The Age of
Subsidiarity as Conflicts Rule
An often unnoticed element of the cases of Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II is that they
laid the ground for establishing the fabric of the Community legal system not only by
means of a hard supremacy rule of conflicts, but also through a unique system of
integration of law from multiple levels. In the process of deepening and widening
European integration, additional and more sophisticated tools became necessary to avoid
the emergence of too many situations of hard conflicts between national and Community
law. Instead of creating rules for solving such conflicts, the idea was to prevent them
through, for example, the principle of subsidiarity.77 Subsidiarity initially was designed as
a kind of a meta-principle for the vertical distribution of legislative powers between the
European and the national levels.78 In reality however, subsidiarity played a much less
important role in the distribution of legislative competences. Instead, the invocation of the
principle of subsidiarity practically much more heavily influenced the distribution of
powers between legislation and implementation. The emergence of subsidiarity as a
constitutional notion thereby historically goes hand in hand with the development of a
system of decentralised yet co-operative administrative structures. These forms of
co-operation have mostly taken the form of executive networks with participants from the
Member States, the Community institutions and private parties.79
75 Case 35/76 Simmenthal I [1976] ECR 1871; Case 106/77 Simmenthal II [1978] ECR 629, para 3.
76 Horizontal effect can also mean an effect of law applied between private parties. The horizontal effect due
to the primacy of EU/EC law arises not only between states but also between individuals. A national measure
might for example be inapplicable in the relation between individuals of one or of several Member States, not
only if it is incompatible with Community law in substance. It may also be inapplicable if it was adopted
violating procedural rules laid down by Community law for the adoption of national provisions. See: C-441/93
Pafitis [1996] ECR I-1347, C-194/94 CIA Security International [1996] ECR I-2201, paras 45–54; C-443/98
Unilever Italia [2000] ECR I-7535, paras 31–52 and C-159/00 Sapod Audic [2002] ECR I-5031, paras 48–52. See
for limitations of this rule C-226/97 Lemmens [1998] ECR I-3711, para 35.
77 Subsidiarity was designed to add an additional level of control for the exercise of public power in the EU.
Article 5(2) EC.
78 The ECJ rarely entered into an in-depth debate over the merits of subsidiarity-related arguments—mainly
due to respect for the legislative discretion of the Community legislator. This made subsidiarity a legally rather
weak tool. See eg C-84/94 Working time directive [1996] ECR I-5755; C-233/94 Deposit guarantee schemes [1997]
ECR I-2405; C- 376/98 Germany v EP and Council (Tobacco advertising) [2000] ECR I-8419; C-377/98
Biotechnological Inventions [2001] ECR I-7079. A more thorough analysis was only undertaken in C-154/04
Alliance for Natural Health of 12 July 2005, paras 101–6.
79 See for further details the contributions to HCH Hofmann and A Türk (eds), EU Administrative
Governance (London, Edward Elgar, 2006) and M Egeberg, ‘Europe’s Executive Branch of Governments in the
Melting Pot: An Overview’ in M Egeberg (ed), Multilevel Union Administration (London, Palgrave, 2006) 1–16.
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The impact of this development becomes clearer when taking a step back and looking at
the emergence of the integrated executive. In the EU-specific system of integration,
executive activity goes beyond implementing activity.80 It also expands to administrative
co-operation in agenda setting81 and policy making82—in all phases of the ‘policy cycle’.
Structures of integrated executive for all three policy phases operate in large parts beyond
the institutions and procedures established by the founding treaties. They have developed
in an evolutionary way differing in each stage of the policy cycle and in each policy area,
creating a rich diversity of administrative actors on the European levels and their forms of
interaction.83 As a consequence of these developments, the originally more or less distinct
vertical and horizontal relations between the European level and the Member States as
well as between Member States’ law have been transformed into a network of complex
relationships.84
European integration has therefore led to an opening of the Member States to the
exercise of public power from outside of their territory, be this from the European level or
from other Member States. At the same time, their branches of government are involved in
the creation, implementation and adjudication of European law and other Member States’
Europeanised law. Member State and EU structures are thus not only subject to EU/EC
law, they also jointly create and implement it. This is now a central notion to EU/EC law of
being an integral part of Member State law. This network structure is the essence of the
notion of shared sovereignty and the supremacy of co-operatively created Community law
over unilateral and Member States’ acts.
80 In this phase, institutions’ activities range from single case decisions and preparatory acts thereof to acts
of administrative rule-making and the amendment of specific provisions in legislation where so authorised. In
many policy areas, the development of the integration of EU and national administrative proceedings has led to
‘composite proceedings’ to which both national and EU administrations contribute. Diverse structures undertake
implementation decisions and administrative rule-making in the various policy areas. Amongst these develop-
ments are ‘Comitology’ committee procedures, in certain policy areas expanded to what is now known as the
‘Lamfalussy’ procedures. Agencies and their administrative networks play an ever-increasing role. Implementing
networks may also include private parties acting as recipients of limited delegation. Administrative networks that
have been created and adapted to the needs of each policy area integrate the supranational and national
administrative bodies within structures designed to conduct joint or co-ordinated action. In practice, these
forms of co-operation consist of obligations of different intensity. They range from obligations to exchange
information either on an ad hoc or on a permanent basis to network structures which have been developed to
include forms of implementation such as individually binding decisions.
81 In the phase of agenda setting, national administrations can play a central role in shaping the Commis-
sion’s policy initiatives. This takes place mainly through expert groups which are generally composed of national
civil servants, but also independent experts. These groups are used to test ideas, build coalitions of experts and
pre-determine policy incentives later to be formally presented by the Commission as initiative.
82 The presence of the national executive actors in the EU’s decision-making process is mostly felt within the
Council working parties supporting COREPER. Here, the national civil servants have to balance their national
mandate against the need to reach a consensus in pursuance of EU tasks. Such interaction, albeit to a lesser
extent, also exists through the ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’.
83 See with more detail: HCH Hofmann and A Türk (eds) EU Administrative Governance (London, Edward
Elgar, 2006).
84 Also, structures have been developed which link European networks with participants from non-EU
Member States.
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Conclusion: Conflicts and Integration—The Future of
Supremacy within a Network
The concentration on supremacy as a central element of vertical conflicts provision gave
birth to an understanding of the EU/EC as a multi-level legal system in which the EU/EC
legal order has been superimposed on the Member States’ legal systems. Questions of
constitutionalisation of the legal order have therefore often been viewed from the
perspective of the relation between these two distinct yet hierarchically linked legal
systems. However, when looking at the evolving network structure of exercising public
power within the EU, it seems that the content and impact of these cases would be severely
underestimated if they were only reviewed for this ‘vertical’ dimension. Instead, the
content and the effect of Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II go far beyond that. They did not
only allow for a network of courts, in which any level of Member States’ courts were able
to interact with the ECJ on the European level under Community rules. This essentially
allowed individuals to effectively challenge the validity of EC law as well as the compliance
of Member State rules with EC law. The latter reflects the needs of individuals in
pluralistic societies, whose interests are not necessarily limited to the territorial limits of
single Member States. The cases also led a dynamism requiring the reinforcement and
development of networks of the executive branches of power. The effect of this was an
exercise of public power not in two separate levels but instead in a more integrated system.
The integration of the new Community legal order into the national legal systems thus
prompted the development of elaborate network structures for integration of Member
States’ and Community interests. Most of the developments have taken place in forms not
established by the treaties. This leads to a view of the European law not in the form of two
superimposed structures with one being the European level85 and the other being the
Member States, each exercising public power only within their respective territories and
competencies. Instead, the European legal system has evolved into a three-dimensional
structure with complex vertical, horizontal and composite relations of the actors therein.
This has consequences not only for our understanding of the role of the EU/EC and the
Member States in Europe but also for the analysis of key aspects such as accountability.
It might be too early to determine the true effect of the developments spurned by Costa
v ENEL and Simmenthal II due to the fact that the process of integration is continuing in
directions which had not been envisaged in prior times. It is a continuing evolutionary
process with a dynamic institutional development. Without the dichotomy of, on one
hand, supremacy and, on the other hand, judicial, legislative and executive integration,
one could have imagined a much less vibrant, more intergovernmental and more
compartmentalised approach to ‘integration through law’. The strength of the current
integration process was initiated with the parallel approach of creating both conflicts rules
as well as fostering procedural and substantive legal integration. This is the remaining
legacy of Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II.
85 With the territorial reach of the EU as described in Article 299 EC.
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